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The State and Forest Resources: An Historical
Analysis of Policies Affecting Forest
Management in the Nepalese Tarai
The Tarai region of Nepal contrasts with the country’s image as a mountainous Himalayan country. The
incorporation of this region into the modern Nepalese state in the eighteenth century brought about a considerable transformation of the landscape and social composition of the region, which has been manifested in
recent decades in contention among disparate social groups over the region’s resources. This transformation
was brought about through state policies to exert control over the Tarai’s extensive forestlands, and of clearing them, eventually allowing land-hungry populations to settle there. In this paper, we examine the political and economic contexts and implications of these policies and explain their continuities and change. We
review forest-related policies as they were adopted during various “eras” of Nepalese history: the unification
period (1750s to 1846), Rana period (1846 to 1950), the transition period (1951 to 1960), Panchayat period
(1961 to 1990), and post-Panchayat period (after 1990). We argue that these policies allowed the state to
assert its sovereignty over the new territory, and that they were designed to strengthen the prevailing regime
at particular times and to privilege the ruling elites to siphon off forest benefits in their favor. More recently
local people have begun asserting their needs and rights. They also tend to problematize this historical expropriation in order to seek equitable solutions. More attention to their demands will help address existing
tensions in the region and avoid potential conflicts in the future.

INTRODUCTION
The Tarai region—the plains area in the southern part of Nepal—contrasts with the image of the
country as mountainous. It is one of Nepal’s three
ecological belts and its social landscape has evolved
distinctly after the region was annexed to the Nepalese state during the second half of the eighteenth
century. The region covers about 17 percent of the
country’s geographical area, but harbors almost a half
of the country’s population (CBS 2004). This article
examines how the largely forested landscape with
scanty settlements in the eighteenth century came to
be transformed together with the formation and subsequent consolidation of the Nepalese state. Drawing
on Barton (2001), we argue that an essential part of
this transformation was an extension and entrenching of state sovereignty into the acquired territory
through the appropriation of land (including forestland). This helps illuminate the unique way in which
the Nepalese state was constructed in its periphery.
We demonstrate that forest was a critical resource for
the sustenance and, at particular times, the expansion of Nepalese state. We suggest that a sustained

aspect of state policy over the Tarai forestland was
to generate resources for the ruling elites and for the
consolidation of regimes that prevailed at a particular
time. In the process, the region has undergone a substantial transformation in its social composition and
landscape over the past two centuries and a half, now
comprising a complex mosaic of social groups which
compete over the region’s resources. The political
consciousness built up since the1950s and especially
the activist discourses of rights, equality, identity, or
self-determination that received prominence in the
post-1990 period have shaped the debates on the
access to or control over forests. These debates have
parallels with the ongoing constitutional discussions
about the restructuring of the Nepalese state with a
federal structure and especially the distribution of
rights and responsibilities at various levels of governance. As a consequence, the governance of Tarai forest has in recent years become a source of tension and
anxiety amongst forest users, policy makers, activists,
and politicians. We conclude that the policies should
be reoriented with greater attention to the diversity
of the people-forest relation in the region and to local
and particular demands that have been put forward.
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Forests serve critical functions for an agricultural economy and at the same time represent a territory upon which
the state or individuals exercise control. Forests provide fuelwood, fodder, timber, medicinal herbs or wild edibles and
serve other ecosystem functions, such as erosion control or
water regulation that are very important for a rural livelihood.
It is especially so in Nepal, where about 60 percent of the
population is directly dependent on farming for their livelihood and particularly to the poor that comprise 31 percent of
the population, with a per capita income below NRs. 7,696
(US$ 150) per year (CBS et al 2006: 122). While the poverty
rate in the Tarai (27.6 percent) is slightly lower than that of
Hills (34.5 percent) and Mountains (32.6 percent) (CBS et al
2006:7), the access to forest is important for many reasons.
For instance, forest augments farm production through the
supply of organic manure and other inputs, and it is important especially in the context of the Tarai’s status as the bread
basket of the country. The Tarai forests also supply timber,
fuel wood, and medicinal herbs to the market and form a
source of income and employment. However, a survey of Nepal’s modern history—understood here to have begun with
the country’s unification into the centralized state in the eighteenth century—reveals that the control and use of forest was
much more politicized than can be understood within the
idea of environmental or economic functions identified just
above. In this article, we demonstrate that a core part of state
policy was to appropriate ownership over the forestland, convert it into agriculture or human settlement on an extensive
scale, and allow land-hungry groups to settle there. By doing this, the rulers generated resources for themselves, consolidated the regime and considerably transformed the social
composition and the landscape of the region.
This transformation was rendered possible after the unification of Nepal through the various phases of its political development. Present day Nepal consisted of about eighty small
principalities before it was unified in 1769 by Prithvi Narayan
Shah, the king of the hill principality of Gorkha, following a
25-year campaign. The period from 1769 to 1846 was aimed
at stabilizing the political process and retaining the country’s
unity after a war with East India Company in 1814-16. The
exploitation of peasants was at its height in this period (Stiller
1976). The internal feud among the ruling elites and difficult
economic situation led to the rise of a family-based dictatorial rule of the Ranas in 1846. Land and forest were the main
sources of revenue to finance the unification process and the
luxurious lifestyle of the ruling elites. In 1951, the Rana rule
ended after a political movement and armed uprising. For
the next decade, there was uncertainty and a preparation for
democratic political system. After a year’s brief experimentation with a democratic system, a new form of rule called
Panchayat system, a party-less, monarchy-guided polity, was
imposed by the then King Mahendra in 1961. The Panchayat rulers emphasized modernization and development and
curtailed political freedom. Panchayat rule lasted for three
decades, until it was overthrown with a people’s movement,
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giving way to a multi-party democratic political system in
1990. Despite impressive economic growth after the political
change, a ‘people’s war’ was unleashed in 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). This insurgency ended in
2006 with a toll of about 15,000 people, and the people’s
movement in 2006 subsequently led to the abolishment of
the monarchy. With this political change, a constitutional assembly elected in 2008 set about drafting a new constitution,
primarily focusing on “restructuring” the state into a federal
structure and on the wide range of promises offered during
the post-1990 period. Access to and control over forest and
other natural resources have become an important aspect of
the constitutional debate and are likely to remain so. In this
article, we focus on the policies adopted after Nepal’s unification by the different political regimes, and the continuities
and changes in forest policies through the modern historical
period, especially as they impacted on the forest resources
of the Tarai and as they benefited some groups rather than
others.
In all these political ‘eras’, the Tarai forest has attracted the
attention of policy makers and politicians due especially to
the abundance of sal (Shorea robusta) timber, which is very
durable and expensive (see DFRS 1999). Accurate statistics
on the change in Tarai forest in different periods is lacking.
There was no inventory of Tarai forest before the 1960s, and
the data for subsequent periods have different definitions of
forest. Nevertheless, it is clear that forest area is consistently
on the decline, simply because the governments promoted
forest clearance in the Tarai until 1990 and there have been
widespread encroachments. Karan and Ishii (1994: 38) reveal
that there was 2.53 million ha of forest in the Tarai (including the Inner Tarai) in 1964-65, which was reduced to 2.03
million ha in 1978-79, i.e., with a deforestation rate of 1.4
percent per year. For the period from 1970 to 1990, deforestation in the Tarai was very high. For example, Zurick and
Karan (2005: 225) reveal that the Tarai forest had been depleted by more than a quarter of its area in this period with
a rate of 4 percent forest loss a year. In part, that is due to
immigration and farmland clearing, but to a great extent the
change results from the activities of the commercial timber
industry. But after 1990, deforestation in the Tarai has slowed
down. The Department of Forestry (DoF) under the Governemnt of Nepal has estimated that in 2000/01, the 20 districts
of the Tarai (including the Inner Tarai) contained 1.39 million
hectares of forest, covering 41.5 percent of the land area. It
further reveals that the deforestation rate during 1990-2000
was negligible (0.06 percent a year), and that in seven districts there was positive gain in forest cover. (DoF 2005:vii).
Forestry policy in the Tarai in the modern period
This section examines the forestry policies of Nepal as
they were adopted in the various ‘eras’ of its modern history.
There is virtually no documented evidence of the schemes
for the use, management or trade of forest resources of the
Tarai during the pre-unification period. Pre-unification rul-

ers depended primarily on the religious and folk perceptions
of how forest or trees were to be valued and used, and they
tended to prohibit tree felling in certain areas, such as around
water bodies (Bhattarai and Khanal 2005). Except for the
three principalities of the Kathmandu valley, these pre-unification principalities did not have significant participation in
trading activities. However, the unification process generated
demand for resources for the centralized state and for the rulers and nobility. For this, however, the Kathmandu rulers had
to expropriate forest and other lands which were previously
held under customary or indigenous forms of ownership and
control (Regmi 1999a). With unification, they asserted the
state sovereignty over these lands, by themselves assuming
the role of administering land grants. When such authority
was established, they were able to redistribute land to individuals in a way that was compatible with their interests. This
“privatization” policy continued until the 1950s, when forests
were nationalized (Hobley and Malla 1996).
Privatization of forests during the Unification period
(1744-1846)
Although the process of Nepal’s unification was most intense in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the “unification period” began in 1744 when the king of Gorkha moved
aggressively against other principalities, and it ended with
the takeover of state power by the Rana rulers in 1846. This
period marked the gradual development and consolidation
of the military and administrative capacity of Gorkhali rule
from Kathmandu, and ended with a massacre in 1846 that
led to the rise of the Ranas. Control of the Tarai was the prime
motivation for Prithvi Narayan Shah to initiate his ambitious
unification process. Regmi (1999b) asserts that the principal
objective in his territorial conquests was to control the Tarai
and the trade routes between India and Tibet, which crossed
through Kathmandu. The main revenue generating resources
were elephants, herbs, timber and land. Therefore, Prithvi Narayan gave emphasis, after takeover of the Kathmandu valley,
to the annexation of the eastern Tarai. The cash revenue from
these areas provided a major portion of financial resources for
the growing military expenditure and for the luxury goods required for the palace and the nobles (Regmi 1999a). In 1793,
Kirkpatrik estimated the total amount of revenue obtained by
the government of Nepal at between Rs. 2.5 million and Rs.
3 million. Of this, Rs. 300,000 to Rs. 400,000 was obtained
from the export duties and profit on the sale of elephants
alone (Kirkpatrick 1811 quoted in Regmi 1999a: 56). Timber
revenue accounted for 40 percent of the total national revenue during this time (Bajracharya 1983:232). As other forest
products were also sold, the total revenue from forest would
have been much greater. Government used the unpaid and
compulsory labor of the local people to gather these products,
including the capture of wild animals such as elephants. Nor
were people compensated for injuries and loss of life suffered
as a consequence of such forms of forced labor, and were required as well to provide their own food and other necessities.

In the initial period of unification, much revenue was required to finance territorial expansion. As a result, export of
timber and other forest products was intensified. But in the
later period, especially after the war with the East India Company which ended in 1816, revenue was increasingly used
for the lavish lifestyle of the ruling class. Imports of luxury
goods from India increased. The financing for this lifestyle
came primarily from the Tarai. For instance, in the timber
export regulations of 1811 (Regmi 1999a) King Girban orders
the export of timber from Chitwan to Calcutta and to build
a temple in Banaras. The order states that timber should be
transported from Chitwan to Tribeni by employing local laborers without pay. At that time, the people living in Chitwan
were the Tharu, and they were put to work on an unpaid and
compulsory basis. The misery of the Tharu is explained in
another account for the districts of Bara, Parsa and Rautahat:
The peasantry are extremely nasty, and apparently
indigent. Their huts are small, dirty and very ill
calculated to keep on the cold winds of the winter
season, for a great many of them have no other
walls, but a few reeds supported by sticks in a
perpendicular direction. Their clothing consists of
some cotton rags, neither bleached nor dyed, and
which seem never to be washed. They are a small,
hard favoured people, and by no means fairer than
the inhabitants of Bengal who are comparatively
in much better circumstances (Hamilton 1819 as
quoted in Regmi 1999a).

The people described by Hamilton were the Tharu, whose
living conditions and even customs were profoundly affected
by the government policies. They were not allowed to build
good houses as government administrators or agents would
ask for taxes. If taxes could not be paid, such houses were
confiscated. Similarly, if they were seen to be wearing good
clothes, government agents would harass them for not paying
taxes or for making savings. Thus the Tharu did not build
good houses and did not wear good clothes. The only way
to consume the surplus was to organize feasts regularly and
to spend in ritual ceremonies. This was done to avoid the
taxes that were levied by local revenue functionary under the
jimidari system. This system was introduced in the Tarai by
the Ranas in 1861, under which jimidars and patwaris, the
local tax agents within the mauja or the village, were given
power to levy the taxes and use unpaid laborers. Attempts
were made to abolish this system in 1953, after the political
change in 1950. But the real legal provision for this abolishment of the jimidari system came in the Land Act of 1964
(Karky 1982; Regmi 1976). But the habit developed prior to
1950 in response to the revenue system persists to the present
and the Tharu are seen by others as conspicuous consumers. Similarly, because the compulsory labor contribution was
determined in the past (prior to 1950) on a family basis, the
Tharu tried to reduce the labor burden by living in joint families. It is only after the early 1960s that rich Tharu began to
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build good houses, to wear good clothes, and to reduce their
family size by separation of sons from the main family.1
In order to increase revenue, government imposed heavy
taxes on people during the unification period. The burden of
taxes was so high, especially in the Tarai, that people were
not able to cultivate the land. For example, as Regmi (1999a:
32) writes, in Morang and other districts where large areas of
waste land suitable for reclamation existed in the final years of
the eighteenth century, several families were actually landless.
They did not cultivate these lands as they had to pay a large
amount of tax. Regmi thus argues that economic inequalities
were much more pronounced in the Tarai than in any other
region of Nepal. It is also a fact that high taxes led to ‘voluntary landlessness’ in the Tarai, especially among the Tharu.
Many Tharu willingly remained landless because they could
not pay the taxes to the jimidar (or landlords) to whom state
had given responsibility to levy the tax. In Chitwan, these
landless Tharu were called bahariya, and worked as attached
laborers to the land cultivators (Tharu peasants cultivating
land after paying the tax—Guneratne 1996). Landlords in
turn met various obligations of these bahariyas because there
was a shortage of labor.
During the unification period, the government did not
have much cash to pay its officials. Administrators were required in the newly acquired territories, and there was great
demand for military personnel and arms for new territorial
conquests. The rulers therefore provided compensation in the
form of land grants. For this, the state expropriated lands or
forests kept under pre-state (customary or indigenous) forms
of ownership and control. Among the land grants, birta was
granted to the elite families, who did not have to pay taxes
on their land. Another grant, called jagir, was made to army
personnel and other functionaries as emoluments. The intention was not only to satisfy the nobility, but also to increase
the revenue base by making such grants on forest or waste
land which previously yielded no tax. Such policy inevitably
entailed a loss of forest cover through the conversion of such
lands into cultivation or settlements. The government further
encouraged deforestation by providing three to four years of
tax exemption on newly reclaimed land.
Forest clearance or conservation was also linked with the
strategic requirements of the unification period. Forests were
destroyed in some strategic locations to create settlements so
that the new settlers could serve to restrict the entry of enemies (i.e., from British India). These settlements were generally the central places where settlements were necessary to be
developed for expansion of cultivation and trade. However,
dense forests were maintained in most other locations as a defense against intrusion from the south, in such a way that only
a few trade routes were left open. For example, land grantees
of Makwanpur were asked to maintain only one north-south
track, whichever was the worst one, through the Churia forest
and watch it so that no other routes were opened up (Regmi
1. This account is based on discussions held in 1996 with elderly
Tharu living around the Chitwan National Park.
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(1999a: 40). This was based on the policy of that time to isolate the Kathmandu valley based on a line defense along the
Churia hills. Local officials were asked to close the tracks by
planting thorny bushes and installing pikes if any other routes
were opened up.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
the government experimented with a new method of promoting land reclamation in the Tarai. Individual entrepreneurs
were given on contract vast areas of land for reclamation and
settlement. The contractor would pay a fee, which was then
gradually increased every year. The contractor could then levy
taxes of his own on the cultivators and settlers. This method
was followed especially in the eastern Tarai, which explains
relatively dense settlements in that part of the Tarai as compared to Western areas. High officials of the Government and
other members of the nobility benefitted from this process
and were allowed both to retain good land on their own and
to raise taxes on other lands given to tenants for cultivation.
In order to maximize revenue, the landowners changed the
form of tenure from adhiya (half share of the produce) to kut
(fixed rent). A vast majority of tenants who depended on cultivating land on adhiya had to pay high kut and to bear the
heavy burden when the crop failed. This increased the debt
burden on these tenant cultivators. Under the kut system, the
highest bidders were given the land for cultivation, causing
many of previous tenants to become wage laborers. They also
started to work as bonded laborers because of the debt they
could not pay to landowners (Malla 2001). This appropriation of high rent by the landlords and taxes by government
made many tenants flee the country and settle in India. The
unification period consolidated the Nepalese state by expanding its control over the newly acquired territories, primarily
through granting land to elites, military personnel, and state
functionaries in return for their loyalty. These policies, on one
hand, attracted settlers to the eastern Tarai and on the other,
placed huge burdens on the peasantry and promoted outmigration.
Continuation of privatization policy during the Rana
Rule (1846-1951)
The Rana rule began after a member of military-aristocratic clan of Ranas—Jung Bahadur Rana—carried out a massacre of courtiers in 1846. Jung Bahadur instituted a “roll of
succession” in which only his family members could become
the prime ministers of Nepal, but that roll was amended as
and when rival Rana members were able to do so. Nevertheless, the Tarai forest received newfound significance during
the period of Rana rule, especially because of the expansion of
the railway network in India and the development of cities in
north India (Regmi 1988). The Ranas had to obtain the support of the British in India for their political survival in Nepal.
One way to obtain this support was to allow British access to
the Tarai’s forest resources. The exploitation of the Tarai forest
was also important for the Ranas to meet their lavish expenses. They continued with the “privatization” policy adopted in

the previous period, but they redistributed the earlier land
grants, especially to benefit their own family members. In addition, the Ranas systematized timber harvest and export with
‘expert’ inputs from British foresters, institutionalized hunting
in Tarai forests as a particular form of diplomacy in order to
cement their relations with the British, and promoted settlements in the southern part of Tarai. Such policies created
hardships for people as they had to work as unpaid labor and
became dispossessed of land.
The policy of land grants in the form of birta and jagir,
thereby privatizing what otherwise was a public resource,
continued vigorously under the Ranas in order to obtain the
support of the elites for the regime. In addition, forests were
given to religious institutions in a separate grant called guthi.
Land grants were made so vigorously that, by the end of the
Rana regime in 1951, about one third of the forestland was
under birta tenure and three quarters of this land belonged to
Rana families (Regmi 1999b; Mahat et al. 1986). Jung Bahadur granted himself as birta the whole land of the “new country” (naya muluk) in the western Tarai that Nepal received
as a gift from Britain for its military support to subdue the
Indian rebellion of 1857. In 1854 he decreed that birta owners could cut trees on their land. But raikar (land owned on
a private basis and obtained by purchase) and jagir owners
could not do that without permission from the government,
which meant that they had to pay taxes or revenues on the
trees they cut (Regmi 2002). This rule was changed in 1918
so that birta owners were only able to cut old and dry trees
without permission from the state and were obliged to share
the revenue with the government (Regmi 2002). This policy
was essentially meant to benefit the birta owners, who were
the ruling families.
The Ranas also assigned the role of colonization of Tarai forests to zamindars (local government functionaries),
who also collected taxes. Ranas also liberalized regulations
related to crimes, slavery, and indebtedness as an additional
inducement for hill people to shift to the Tarai. For example,
criminals and runaway slaves who reclaimed wasteland in the
Tarai were pardoned and given freedom. Debtors who did so
were also given a grace period to repay the loan. Due to such
a policy, Gurung (1999) mentions that 76,000 bighas (approximately 55,000 ha) of forestland was reclaimed in 1897
in two districts of Kailali and Kanchanpur by 346 families
from the hills. However, due to the inhospitable climate and
malaria infestation, hill people were hesitant to migrate to
the Tarai. Thus the Ranas encouraged Maithili, Bhojpuri and
Abadhi speaking communities to expand their farms and for
Indians to settle in the Tarai. If the Indians moved in with
families, they would be given free agricultural land, home
sites and building materials (wood). Some of them were also
appointed as zamindars, though the preference for this position was given to hill migrants. These policies were meant to
generate revenue for the state by expanding cultivation and
levying high taxes on agricultural land. This led a section of
the Tharu population to remain landless (bahariyas) and to

work for landlords.
The dense forests of the Tarai were also used by the Ranas for hunting, especially as Ranas were themselves “game
enthusiasts” and were keen to invite British elites to join their
hunting parties. Every year, the nobility of Kathmandu spent
their winter in the Tarai, mainly engaged in hunting (Mishra
and Jefferies 1991: 22). A huge number of local people had
to provide their services on a compulsory basis during these
hunting expeditions. Very large hunting trips were also organized for the British because the Ranas had to maintain cordial relationships with them. Landon (2001: 252) mentions
the burden on local population caused by these hunting trips.
The setting up of the camps, arranging food, providing escorts during the hunting, driving the elephants, and driving
the wild animals towards the hunters would require a large
number of people. The impact of these hunting trips on the
local people was thus enormous. An elderly Tharu, who also
saw and experienced the Ranas, reported in our interview that
at least one person from a household was required to work for
such hunting trips on a compulsory basis. The food required
for these trips were also locally arranged, except for items that
were not available in the locality. Similarly, every household
had to provide a healthy goat and good rice for food. This
was a big burden on the local Tharu population (Adhikari et
al 2006). But the Ranas declared rhinoceros as a royal game
animal, giving it a measure of protection, and prohibited the
people from killing wild animals even if the latter destroyed
their crops and livestock. The hunting in the Tarai forest was
thus designed to favor the ruling class at the expense of the
local population.
The Rana rulers wanted to maximize revenue with the export of forest products. This was a continuation of past policy,
but it was pursued more vigorously after Jung Bahadur came
to power. The 1850s saw a greater demand for sal timber in
India due to its urbanization and industrialization (Regmi
1988). To obtain more revenue, the first Rana prime minister abolished the ijara2 system in favor of amanat,3 in which
salaried people handled the logging and export of timber.
Regmi mentions that kathmahals4 were the linchpin of this
new system in the Tarai. These officers were spread throughout the Tarai and were supervised from the central level. The
government experimented with several schemes of harvesting
and export, and established saw mills, built railway lines and
dredged rivers to facilitate timber export (Gaige 2009 [1975],
Regmi 1988). The trade of timber and other forest produce
benefited only the ruling class in Nepal and the business people from India. The role of the common peasantry was to help
this trade (for example, by harvesting forest products), often
without pay. They remained impoverished as they could not
2. A system in which individuals were contracted out by the government in order to perform specified functions.
3. A system of mobilising salaried personnel to undertake public
works.
4. An office established for the management of the timber trade from
the Tarai and Inner Tarai districts.
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benefit from their own resources.
The Ranas wanted to systematize tree felling and export
and to maximize revenue from the Tarai forests. They solicited British expertise in the 1920s in order to reorganize forestry operations. For this, J. V. Collier, a Deputy Conservator
of the Forest Department of India, was deputed to the Nepal
government in 1923. After Lord Dalhousie’s Forest Charter
of 1855, India’s Forest Department had already evolved as a
forerunner throughout the British Empire in combining the
environmental functions of the forests to the industrial, settlement and budgetary imperatives of the state (Barton, 2001).
Accordingly, Collier emphasised large-scale clear felling for
the sale of timber and for the expansion of the area under cultivation (2001[1928]: 252). Collier proposed large-scale and
extensive clearings, the development of settlements, and the
reduction of timber wastage. Similarly, the granting of large
parcels of forestland to kin members of ruling elites, military
personnel and the nobility led to the conversion of the traditionally managed, community-owned woodlots into the private property of the absentee landlords. These conversions
were carried out with the compulsory labor of the indigenous
people (like the Tharu and others) and the fields left for cultivation by tenants. Land grants thus wiped out indigenous
management practices and were detrimental to the community management of resources (Bhattarai et al 2002).
Thus the main focus of forest policy during the Rana period was to raise revenue from the reclamation of forestland,
to earn revenue from forest produce, and to maintain good
relationships with the British. The rulers appropriated extensive areas of forest and cultivated lands and the unpaid labour
of the peasantry, reducing the latter to serfdom. They grossly
abused their power and prerogatives to amass wealth and to
live in luxury, in ways that “no oriental despot matched . . . in
terms of arbitrary taxation” (Amatya 2004). Each Prime Minister took at least 25-30 percent of the state revenue, while
95 percent of the peasantry was landless and depended on
share-cropping or rent (ibid: 330-1). The landlessness partly
explains the exodus of pahade groups eastward to Darjeeling,
Sikkim, Bhutan and Burma. The excessive exploitation by the
Ranas, therefore, set the stage for radical groups to emerge
with egalitarian ideals and to wage an armed rebellion against
the regime.
The nationalization and populist policies of the
transition and Panchayat periods
This section discusses the forestry policies of two periods: the transition period (1951-60) and the Panchayat rule
(1961-90). Though distinct politically, these periods share
a certain continuity of forestry policies. The forests brought
under private control during the Rana period were initially
nationalised, and subsequently brought under a populist
program (Hobley and Malla 1996). These and several other
policy measures were taken after the downfall of the Rana
regime in February 1951. This political change came with
a promise of multi-party democracy and a new constitution
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(Shaha 1996), and in the main converted the Nepalese people
from serfs into citizens (Amatya 2004). After nearly two centuries of seclusion, the change allowed Nepal to “open” to
the outside world, rendering feasible the exchange of people
and ideas. However, a part of these achievements, especially
a polity based on multi-party democracy, received a set-back
as King Mahendra removed the elected government in December 1960. It led to a three-decade long panchayat5 regime
within which the king became all-powerful, banned political groups, and curtailed civil liberties to a significant degree
(Joshi and Rose 2004). Nevertheless, the end of the Rana regime involved a modernising mission insofar as it negated the
feudal appropriation of resources and, to a large extent, the
arbitrary exercise of state power. Written laws and policies became essential in the post-1951 period and state institutions
like the bureaucracy and the judiciary began to recruit personnel based on merit and academic qualification. The idea of
planned development was cherished after the political change
(Joshi and Rose 2004), and the forestry sector became part
and parcel of state planning. Private forest was nationalized
in 1957 through the Private Forests Nationalization Act. This
policy marked an end to discretionary granting of large parcels of forests to elites, which had been common in the past
two centuries. This also helped in bringing back a small part
of forests in the Tarai which had been granted to elites but not
cleared for cultivation. The government identified forests as
national property, portraying itself as a public trustee of the
resource. This “statisation” fitted environmental imperatives
with the industrial, settlement or budgetary objectives of the
state, pursued primarily under the rubric of “national interest” (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2007; Barton 2001). This
policy, however, has been criticized for alienating and dispossessing the local people from the forest resources upon which
they depended and is held responsible for the widespread forest destruction that followed (e.g., Gilmour and Fisher 1991;
Hobley and Malla 1996).
Panchayat rule instituted a much more systematic regulatory approach with a number of specific laws related to development, conservation and utilization of forest resources. The
initiation of five-year periodic planning and the forestry planning that followed implicitly assumed that the state was the
agency responsible for supplying the forest product-related
needs of the people. The planning converged on the idea of
developing settlements and cities in certain areas of the Tarai
and supplying by the state agencies the timber and fuelwood
needed both in Kathmandu and the new towns. The creation
of the Timber Corporation of Nepal (TCN), the Fuelwood
Corporation, Forest Products Development Board and the
plantation projects in Jhapa, Sarlahi and Banke districts indicates the state’s preference for state owned parastatals to the
creation of local institutions or market mechanisms through
5. Panchayat refers to a party-less system of government (1961-1990)
under the direct rule of the King. It also refers to the representative units—
National, Zonal, District and Village panchayats—that constituted the levels
according to which popular representation was organized.

which forest products could be raised, owned and traded.
TCN sold timber only to selected customers at a fifth to a
third of the market rate and was abused by officials working
in it (Ghimire 1992). Similarly, the plantation schemes were
obsessed with “fast growing species”, such that the climax sal
forests in Sarlahi, Jhapa and Banke districts were replaced
with exotic species. The introduction of alien species jeopardized critical environmental functions and led to the denial of
the multiple products needs of local people. These schemes
proved flawed in that these badly predicted future needs: fuelwood and timber as a source of energy or electric poles for
the cities were increasingly replaced with alternatives such as
concrete or metal for the electric poles, and kerosene and petroleum for urban domestic energy needs. In the period from
1950 to 1970, forest industries were also established in the
Tarai. Donors also supported these industries, and alliances
developed between the Forest Department, local elites and
donors (Malla 2001, Pravat 2006, Skar 1999). These industries were mainly saw mills, wood processing plants (seasoning of wood and application of preservatives in poles), and
products from wood (like catechin—Kattha—from the wood
of Acacia catechu locally called Khayar tree, and production
of matches), oil extraction plants and furniture factories.
Some industries were established in the Tarai which basically
used raw materials from the hills. For instance, resin and turpentine industries, which used resin from pine trees (Pinus
roxburghii) which are found in mid hills, were established.
These industries were owned mainly by elites, who could depend on forest bureaucrats to give extra-legal permission to
cut trees and exploit other forest resources and to overlook
their illegal extraction of forest products (e.g., more than the
official quota). The factory owners would give forest bureaucrats a share of the benefits they would make from the extra
legal activities. Donors give financial and technical aid to the
projects producing raw materials for these industries. This led
to the monopolizing of benefits by government bureaucrats
and local elites, while peasants were not able to take advantage of these policies to gain access to forest benefits.
With the nationalization of forests, the state was conceived
as the exclusive agency to protect forests from the people.
Two key approaches emerged: the first, strict protection of
forests as sanctuaries, and the second, protecting forests with
use of force and coercion. Many protected areas were declared
(commencing with the Mahendra Mriga Kunja (literally deer
park, but it was meant as a Rhino sanctuary) for protection
of both flora and fauna in their natural habitats. By 1984, five
national parks and wildlife reserves6 had been established in
the Tarai. Around 3000 sq. km. of forests of the region were
protected prior to 1990. On the other hand, the Forest Act
of 1961 and Forest Protection (Special Arrangements) Act of
1967 adopted the “fortress” approach to the conservation of
6. Chitwan National Park (932 sq km), Bardia National Park (968 sq
km), Shukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve (305 sq km), Koshi Tappu Wildlife
Reserve (175 sq km) and Parsa Wildlife Reserve (499 sq km) (CBS, 2003:
100-101).

public forests and the use of force was employed to deter tree
felling. Patrolling with armed forest guards in the Tarai became the norm.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nepal was seen as a
country facing massive environmental degradation (Eckholm
1976). The alarm created during this time is captured in the
Theory of Himalayan Degradation (Ives and Messerli 1989),
which emphasized population pressure on land, deforestation, decline of farm productivity and further deforestation
leading to soil erosion and land degradation in the form of
landslides and river cuttings. The flooding in the Tarai and in
the Gangetic plain in India and Bangladesh was linked with
deforestation in the hills of Nepal. This concept led to emphasis on forest conservation in the hills (Guthman 1997).
As a result, policies formed during this period emphasized
forestry programs in the hills and neglected the Tarai. For example, the National Forestry Plan of 1976 (DoF 1976) stated
that the forestry administration was almost wholly engaged in
the Tarai in the past, and the absence of Department of Forest presence in the hills was identified as one reason for the
deterioration of hill forests and widespread landslides. But the
Churia range in the Tarai also received some attention as it
was also a source of sedimentation leading to river bed rising
and flooding in rivers flowing to the Tarai. Accordingly the
Churia Forestry Development Project was implemented with
support from the German Government. The overall focus of
the government in the Panchayat period was to develop the
Tarai as an important region of cereal grains and commercial
crops. The concern again was on national development rather
than on meeting the aspirations and basic needs of the Tarai
people (Bajracharya 1983). On the other hand, this theory of
“environmental degradation” increased state control on Tarai
forests (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). But the government did
not gain the trust of the common people who had been the
guardians of the Tarai forests (Malla 2001). As a result, deforestation increased rapidly.
The solution to the problem of environmental degradation
was sought by fitting it within Panchayat “democracy”. It was
acknowledged that the government was unable to effectively
undertake the role of forest conservation and management
on its own, and that it was essential to seek people’s cooperation in forestry programs. With donor support, the participatory forestry policies were adopted in the late 1970s. The
involvement of panchayats, especially the village Panchayats
(i.e., lowest political units) in forest protection was conceived
in the National Forestry Plan of 1976, and was materialized
through the promulgation of Panchayat Forest and Panchayat Protected Forest Rules in 1978. In case of Panchayat
Forest, government could give a maximum of 125 hectares
of its degraded forest land (waste land or only with stumps)
to a village Panchayat for reforestation for the interest of the
communities. Panchayat Protected Forests were the forest
given by government to village panchayats to be protected
and managed by them. A maximum of 500 hectares of forest
could be given to a panchayat as Panchayat Protected Forest.
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reduced by more than 20 percent in the ten years from 1964
to 1973, from 1,344,000 ha in 1964 to 1,067,000 ha in 1973
(Browning 1974). Figure 2 shows the planned acreage for forest clearance and the number of families migrated under the
scheme. Some families of indigenous people like the Tharu
who had opted to remain as landless laborers also got some
land from the resettlement program. However, many of them
did not want to own land in their name because of the fear of
being taxed. These Tharu, however, remained landless laborers, and in many cases as bonded laborers (Guneratne 1996).
A particular version of nationalism promoted during the
Panchayat period also influenced the resettlement and forestry policies. The need to establish a Nepali identity as different
from Indian identity and the need to come out from the Indian shadow was the driving force of state-sponsored nationalism. The increased migration of population from India was
also taken as a threat to Nepali identity and to the Panchayat
system. For example, former Foreign Minister S. Upadhyay
Forest Area (ha) & No of Families

In both cases, the politicians supporting the panchayat system and involved in the village panchayat were given power
to manage and use these forests. This granted some rights of
forest use to the local people through panchayat leadership
that was politically and ideologically subservient to the centralized political establishment, but was nevertheless elected
by local people. The introduction of participatory forestry
through such local political institutions focused also on hills
forests rather than the Tarai. In both these categories the progress in the Tarai is very low as is shown in the Figure 1. By the
mid-1980s, it was understood that these policy changes did
not allow the full participation of local people, as the rights
and duties were vested in local politicians. The Master Plan
for the Forestry Sector (MPFSP 1989) adopted “community
forestry” as a principal “primary program” with a commitment of almost half of the budgetary outlays for entire forestry
sector. As we will discuss below, this program did not make
good progress in the Tarai.
The indigenous population of the Tarai also suffered due
to the policy of resettlement. Until the 1950s, the climate of
the Tarai was considered unfriendly and hostile for the hills
people and was particularly infamous for malaria, although
many indigenous communities have long been settled in the
region. A malaria eradication program supported by the U.S.
government from the late 1950s through the 1970s, and the

70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1956

First Plan
(1957-62)

Second Plan
(1962-65)

Third Plan
(1965-1970)

Fourth Plan
(1970-75)

Fifth Plan
(1975-80)

Sixth Plan
(1980-85)

Year & Plan Period

25000

Area Cleared, ha

No of families

Forest Area, ha

20000

Figure 2: Forest clearance and human settlement in Nepal Tarai
Note: Figures for the fifth and sixth plan period are targets.
Source: Developed after FAO (1999).

15000

10000

5000

0
High Mtn

Mid Mtn

Siwalik

Tarai

Region
Panchayat Forest

Panchayat Protected Forest

Figure 1: Status of Panchayat and Panchayat Protected Forests (1986)
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establishment of the Nepal Resettlement Company (NRC) in
1964 resulted in the rapid migration of hill people into the
Tarai. The basic aim of the NRC was to distribute land to
disadvantaged groups such as the landless, flood and landslide victims, refugees and immigrants of Nepali origin returning from other countries, mainly Burma. However, in
reality, only the supporters of the Panchayat system obtained
the land and a much greater area was encroached on illegally
(Pokhrel 1995). During 1964-1974, NRC distributed 77,700
ha of forestland in the Tarai, and an additional 237,600 ha of
forestland were encroached upon (see Donovan 1978). Because of this, the area of commercial forests in the Tarai was
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(1991) recalls a diplomatic spat that ensued between Nepal
and India after people in Gorakhpur in India tried to establish
settlements in the forestlands within the Nepal border. This
perhaps explains the haste with which protected areas were
established in the Tarai; doing this would provide a justification to avert any settlement intrusions from India. The Tarai
community was not considered truly faithful in promoting
Nepali identity as these communities were considered in the
eyes of the politicians and planners close to the Indian community. To counter this perceived threat the government not
only encouraged hill to Tarai migration, but also selectively
promoted the resettlement of ex-army personnel along the
border even at the cost of the forest with the aim of counteracting any threats to Nepali identity (see also Ghimire 1992
and Gurung 1999).
The resettlement policy of the Panchayat period significantly changed the social composition of the Tarai, especially by a continuous rise of the share of its population in the
post-1951 period. In the 1952/54 census, the Tarai had 35.2
percent of Nepal’s population but its share increased to 46.7
percent in 1991 and 48.4 percent in 2001 (MOPE 2003: 7).
The pahade (hill) groups comprised just 5.9 percent of Tarai

A typical settlement of Musahar in Mahottari. The shortage of firewood has led to the burning of rice straw for warmth during winter.

population in 1952/54, but they increased to 31.7 percent in
1991 (Gurung 2004: 430) and to 35 percent in 2001. The
migration was intense during 1971-81, when the Tarai population increased with an all-time high of 4.11percent per
year, against the overall rate of 2.66 percent for the country
(MOPE 2003: 8). The continuing increase of pahade groups
in the Tarai was resented by madhesi (plains) groups. In the
1960s, for instance, a group called Tarai Liberation Front
(TLF) was established for armed resistance. However, three
successive heads of the TLF were killed by the government
security forces during 1963-9. The legacy of this martyrdom
is valorised within the militant madhesi groups that have
emerged in the 2000s (see Gautam 2007).
Similarly, the Tarai forests also bore the brunt of the referendum in 1980.7 To finance the campaign for the Panchayat
system, the Tarai forest was extensively used to generate resources or given open access status for a while. It is difficult
to ascertain precisely the extent of forest destruction or the
funds raised. But one source claims that for the 1980 referendum alone, timber worth rupees one billion was extracted
to generate resources to win votes in favor of the Panchayat
system, which was supported by the king. The Panchayat
7. This referendum allowed people to choose between a “reformed
panchayat democracy” and “multi-party rule.”

Photo: Jagannath Adhikari

political workers were permitted to fell trees and earn money
as an incentive to support the political system. Many of them
profited greatly through this process. Most Panchayat leaders had a stake in the referendum, and they wanted to retain
their political workers in a campaign “support the supporters” (karyakarta bachau) for their own success. Some political leaders were notorious for clearing the forest (Jha 1993).
During the referendum, a large number of Indian merchants
and contractors were employed for the extraction of timber.
The license for the export of timber was taken from Kathmandu by politicians supporting Panchayat politics, who
subcontracted the work to Indian merchants. At that time, it
was usual to find saw mills along the border but on the Indian
side with advertisements saying, “Nepali sal timber is available here”. In a group discussion among the elderly Tharu
in Thori area of Chitwan in 1996, it was revealed that huge
piles of less useful logs and tree branches were still seen inside
the forests, which were the remnants of the forest destruction
done during the referendum time.
It is clear that during the four decades after the political change of 1951, government policies made significant
alterations in the social composition and the landscape of
the Tarai region. The government policies adopted for two
centuries prior to 1950 had encouraged the immigration of
caste groups from north India, especially in search of land,
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pastures, and for tree-felling and logging work carried out on
an extensive scale. In the post-1950 period, however, it was
the hills groups who were actively encouraged to settle in the
Tarai. The indigenous groups, such as the Tharu or Dhimal,
remained at the losing end as the newcomers were more vigorous in claiming control over land. As the modernization
project of panchayat succeeded to some extent in extending
state rationality to frontier areas, these three groups found
themselves opposed to each other in manifold ways. The full
range of contention among these groups is not explored here,
but we try below to present briefly how the particular social
composition and spatial spread of these social groups have
served to resist the otherwise successful community forestry
program in Nepal.
Troubles in community forestry program: the PostPanchayat period
The restoration of multiparty democracy after the popular
movement of 1990 provided a level of freedom and citizens’
rights unprecedented in Nepal’s history. This allowed marginal
groups to put forward and articulate their demands. But there
had been a rapid change in the political set-up after 1990 and
the period is denoted here simply as the “post-panchayat period.” The forestry policies of this period are primarily based
on the Master Plan for Forestry Sector (MPFS) (MPFSP 1988),
which indeed became meaningful only after the promulgation
of the Forest Act, 1993 and Forest regulations, 1995 (HMGN
1993; 1995). The main forestry program of the post-panchayat period is “community forestry” (CF) within which the local
people are entrusted with the rights and responsibilities of the
use and management of forest resources. The CF is considered a very successful program; with it, forest destruction was
reversed, and barren lands extensively reforested. The success
of the CF program was achieved in the hill areas, but it experienced several problems in the Tarai.
The CF was not promoted in Tarai as much as in the
hills. For example, of about 14,000 community forestry users groups (CFUGs) formed within CF by 2004, only about a
thousand were from the Tarai. Moreover, only about six percent of the total forest area in the Tarai is under CF, while
nationally, this is about 24 percent (Bampton et al 2004: 318319). The MPFS did not, with regard to management regimes,
distinguish among the ecological regions, and the Forest Act,
1993 stipulated a common framework for all of them. Even
when local communities wanted community forests, many of
them had to “capture” it forcibly from the government (Dhungana and Bhattarai 2005). Similarly, the government introduced a new policy in 2000, which stressed the development
of collaborative forestry schemes in the Tarai (MFSC 2000).
This new scheme provided greater authority to the Forest Department and other district stakeholders at the expense of the
local communities, and reduced their access to and control
over the forest. This has led to a form of stalemate in forestry
development in the Tarai region, though collaborative forestry has not received any significant momentum until now.
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A number of arguments have shaped the CF versus collaborative forestry debate with regard to the Nepalese Tarai.
As was discussed earlier, the southern part of the Tarai was
cleared of forest during Rana rule or the unification period,
and thereby has a longer history of settlement. The groups
who settled in this part of the region are the Madhesi (plains
people), who established themselves close to the forest. Later,
as forests were destroyed and new people, mainly from hills,
settled in that newly reclaimed land, the earlier settlers like
the Madhesis found themselves further away from the remaining forest land. This is mainly because of the post-1950
policy of forest clearance and settlement. Under community
forestry, the hill people (pahade groups) become privileged
simply because they now happen to be close to the forest area,
which mostly lies in the foothills of the Siwalik hills (Baral
and Subedi 1999). It is also argued that handing over forests
to nearby communities would reward these settlers and encroachers and set a wrong precedent for other areas (JTRC
2000). A large population is thereby deprived of using the
same forest resources (Takimoto 2000; IDA 2003). The government foresters and madhesi activists argue that the “hill
model” of CF is inequitable and inappropriate for the Tarai
and want collaborative forestry to be in place. Another argument has been that the Tarai communities are internally too
heterogeneous to provide them with the cohesion necessary
for the collective activity required for successfully managing
CF programs. Similarly existing policies and laws are not clear
as to how forest product needs of the southern Tarai residents
(sometimes called “distant users”) are to be fulfilled. Forestry
officials also exhibit a desire to take back the departmental
authority extinguished under the CF policy. A study has revealed that land allocated for CF in the Tarai is degraded as
compared to Protected Areas and National Forests (Nagendra
2002). As the community forest in such cases is in poor initial
condition, it will take time and effort to make it productive.
The institutional set up for CF in the Tarai is also leading to
degradation of forest and the siphoning of benefits to local
elites and government agencies. This seems to occur in resource-rich CFs (Iversen et al 2006). As a result, the benefits
of CF in the Tarai have not reached the common people.
Beyond the above arguments, the Tarai forests have become a rich site of contention amongst politicians, bureaucrats, activists, local communities and development agencies.
These groups also employ the newfound freedoms of the
post-panchayat period and occasionally use the forest as a referent in discussions about the restructuring of the Nepalese
state. The Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal
(FECOFUN) is a forerunner in engaging in mass mobilization to press community claims over forest resources. Since
the mid 1990s, it has collaborated with a dozen other organizations to form a Tarai Community Forestry Action Team
(TECOFAT) which foiled several attempts by the government
to introduce programs that aimed at giving forests to multinational companies. For example, TECOFAT has successfully
foiled the government’s attempt in the early 1990s to bring

a Finish multinational company to manage forests in Bara.
TECOFAT was formed as an alliance of people interested to
have community forests and of NGOs supporting them in this
endeavor. Similarly, FECOFUN has been actively encouraging local people in the Tarai to claim community forests, as
the government is slowing down the process of handing over
community forestry to its users. In a few cases, FECOFU has
also encouraged people to declare the forest they use as community forest and use it accordingly (Dhungana and Bhattarai
2005).
In the later half of the 2000s, madhesi groups have become increasingly vocal and assertive, and at times militant,
in asserting their rights. They have also organized into a
collaborative forestry federation, which has placed counterclaims on the government, thereby seeking to counterbalance FECOFUN influence. In more recent activist discourses,
the madhesi groups project themselves as autochthonous by
claiming their origin in the region and by projecting pahade
groups as alien and “colonialists”. By doing this, they claim
privileged rights over resources. The Tharu have similarly
been waging movements in the past couple of years. They see
themselves as victimized by pahade and madhesi settlers and
seek to redress historical injustices. Tharu groups in western
Nepal have also started levying a “tax” on timber transportation, by referring to ILO convention 169. The recent activist
attitudes tend to justify a group’s claims over material and
“symbolic” resources by creating a story or “myth” of its origin
in a territory.

Preparing timber for selling.

This recent activist posturing is likely to continue for
some years to come, but it hardly responds to how the local
people would benefit from the rich forests of the Tarai. The
activist attitudes have characteristically been elitist, constructing problems and offering solutions that serve those who are
socially well-placed. The government plans for Tarai forest
management have been in disarray and the forestry department has failed to win the goodwill of the people. The ongoing process of constitution-making is keenly observed by civil
society and other groups, especially on the sharing of rights
and responsibilities between the different layers of government. However, forestry issues have become sidelined in recent years, as larger political problems have received priority.
A dominant form of political negotiation has been through
the use of muscle power and to seek a “bargaining solution,”
rather than engaging in rational deliberations involving the
multiple stakeholders. How forest resources of the Tarai will
be governed and managed will primarily depend on the ways
in which the new constitution will settle the competing demands of several stakeholders and on the ways in which
rights and responsibilities will be determined for different layers of society. As the authority from above is resisted in activist, indigenous and other localizing discourses, it is essential
to pay greater heed to the demands and needs of local people
in order to craft solutions that work. Constitutional and other
reforms are less likely to be effective unless they are properly
founded on legitimacy built up from below.

Photo: Mani Ram Banjade
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CONCLUSION
In this article, we examined the policies of the Nepalese
state regarding the use and management of forest resources
of the Tarai region of Nepal. We were particularly concerned
with how the state became entangled with the control of forestland and the distribution of forest benefits among social
actors. We maintained that forestland served as a site upon
which the new centralized state extended and entrenched its
sovereignty since the eighteenth century, and thereafter used
the forest to serve several other objectives of the state. The
discussion on policies was organized according to the major “eras” defining Nepalese history and in reference to the
continuities and change over time. An enduring goal of the
governments was to consolidate the particular regimes, and
it was realized by satisfying powerful groups through land
grants. Forests provided the resources needed for the expansionary mission and for the increasingly demanding royal
household, but at the expense and misery of peasants and
tenants. After 1950, however, policy approaches took diverse paths and were a response to environmental concerns.
The political change of 1990 brought in an entirely different environment within which previously marginalized social
groups became assertive and, at times, militant. Currently, the
governance and management of forest resources of the Tarai rests on the determination of constitutional arrangements
and on the activist articulations about the rights of disparate
groups.
The Tarai forest has always been attractive to political
elites, primarily because forest and land resources are still significant part of country’s economy and people’s livelihoods.
Moreover, as the economy of the country is still to take off in
terms of industrialization and non-farm income within the
country, forest and land, especially of Tarai, are still attractive
resources. Politicians, activists and development agencies are
therefore keen to construct their constituency in relation to
forest and land resources. The militant character of Nepalese
politics in the post-1990 period has allowed these groups to
adopt similar strategies. For this, they const forest narratives
with reference to larger political critique about Nepalese history. Accordingly, the demands about a group’s rights and title
over forest have become more troublesome and confrontational in recent years. These demands are likely to be politically charged until a broad understanding and compromise
on the equitable settlement of rights and obligations between
the disparate social groups emerges. This essentially requires
an understanding of the full scope and political implications
of the socio-cultural diversity of Nepal and demands an astute approach to managing that diversity. The realization of
environmental or economic functions of forests necessitates a
consensus on equitable ways to utilize forest resources, which
is best achieved through constitutional reforms and social deliberation. This requires greater attention to local social contexts and the development of localized solutions.
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